Commentary on van Laar by Boger, George
University of Windsor
Scholarship at UWindsor
OSSA Conference Archive OSSA 8
Jun 3rd, 9:00 AM - Jun 6th, 5:00 PM
Commentary on van Laar
George Boger
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholar.uwindsor.ca/ossaarchive
Part of the Philosophy Commons
This Commentary is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty of Arts, Humanities and Social Sciences at Scholarship at UWindsor. It has
been accepted for inclusion in OSSA Conference Archive by an authorized conference organizer of Scholarship at UWindsor. For more information,
please contact scholarship@uwindsor.ca.
Boger, George, "Commentary on van Laar" (2009). OSSA Conference Archive. 101.
http://scholar.uwindsor.ca/ossaarchive/OSSA8/papersandcommentaries/101
 
Boger, G. (2009). Commentary on Jan Albert Van Laar’s “Argumentative Bluff in Eristic 
Discussion: An analysis and evaluation.” In: J. Ritola (Ed.), Argument Cultures: 
Proceedings of OSSA 09, CD-ROM (pp. 1-9), Windsor, ON: OSSA.  
Copyright © 2009, the author. 
 
Commentary on Jan Albert Van Laar’s “Argumentative Bluff in 
Eristic Discussion: An analysis and evaluation” 
 
GEORGE BOGER 
 
Department of Philosophy 
Canisius College 
2001 Main Street 
Buffalo, New York 14208-1098  
USA 
BOGER@canisius.edu 
 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION—VAN LAAR’S PROJECT 
 
Professor van Laar presents his readers with a discussion aimed at providing initial steps 
toward developing a theory of eristic discussion, an important component of which is 
having criteria for argumentation evaluation. He intends to answer the question how 
recognizing the context of an eristic discussion might affect, or even facilitate, argument 
evaluation, and he uses argumentative bluff as a test case. Because eristic discussion 
seems by its nature not to lend itself to ‘abiding the rules of the game’—for, after all, all’s 
fair in love and war—van Laar has to find a way to tame this recalcitrant sibling of the 
argumentation family to render it amenable to reasonable analysis. 
 
2. ERISTIC DISCUSSION 
 
Van Laar locates an eristic discussion within the dialogue framework of Walton and 
Krabbe as a sub-type, along with the quarrel, under eristic dialogue. He considers an 
eristic discussion to be a 
 
highly adversarial and competitive [agonistic, polemical] kind of conversation where each party 
tries to create the impression on the part of the attending audience that it is he who is the most 
clever and skilful discussant, in a shared attempt to settle upon an appropriate intellectual 
hierarchy between the participants. (p. 1; emphasis added) 
 
Discussion, conversation, discourse, and dialogue in this connection are all forms of 
argumentation, which we take van Laar, following in the modern argumentation 
movement, to consider a kind of social activity. In the case of an eristic argumentation, 
the discussion is a kind of antagonistic game performed in front of an audience, the 
purpose of which is to settle the intellectual hierarchy that at the outset is undecided. The 
core of the antagonism is that each disputant holds a proposition that is the contrary or 
contradictory of that of his opponent. Each antagonist “aim[s] at striking and defeating 
the other side by appearing to be verbally more skilful” (p. 3). Moreover, working with a 
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game-model, there are the two disputants and the audience—and here we see that the 
audience on its own authority “serves as a jury, eager to find out who deserves to be 
declared the honourable winner” (p. 3).  
The unambiguous goal of an eristic discussion is for one of the disputants to be 
the victor. Van Laar refers to the disputants sharing this purpose, their having a “shared 
goal” as in a soccer game or, we might add, as in any war, both of which are highly 
cooperative if only for maintaining the engagement. 
The jury who decides the victor of an eristic discussion is the audience, which 
consists in laymen—an audience is typically “heterogeneous and mainly made up of 
laymen, both with regard to the topic at issue and to the techniques of discussion” (p. 6). 
These jurypersons are not argumentation analysts. 
Thus, each disputant must develop a strategy and deploy certain tactics by using 
an arsenal of techniques or ploys. Principal to his/her strategy is “to create the 
impression, on the part of the audience, that he or she prevails” (p. 4). 
 
The aim is not so much to act dialectically reasonable and rhetorically successful, but to create the 
impression, on the part of the judging audience, that one’s strategic manoeuvring is successful. (4; 
author’s emphasis) 
 
Van Laar is quite emphatic about each disputant’s concern—namely, to create in the 
mind of a particular audience the appearance that he/she is the more reasonable, the more 
assertive, the more skilful, the more knowledgeable, or whatever criteria might be 
introduced (p. 5). But the point remains that eristic discussion is not concerned with truth 
and falsity, but with the appearance of truth and falsity, indeed, with the appearance of 
any factor so long as it satisfies an audience about the one or the other’s superior 
presence. Each discussant, then, has an open-ended arsenal of techniques, and this 
invariably means that the victor will be the one who has a greater store of techniques, is 
skilled at deploying them, and who can size up his/her audience and his/her opponent 
more incisively. 
Eristic discussion trades in appearances and not in reality. Of course, many 
argumentationists have for the most part suspended judgment about, or bracketed, reality 
in favour of audience adherence with reference to the context dependence of acceptability 
of premises and inferential links. In this connection, then, we cannot attribute to eristic 
discussion the goal of conflict resolution; such a goal is extraneous to the purpose of such 
discourse. Again, “eristic discussion is the kind of game that aims at finding out who is 
most capable, shrewd, smart and artful when it comes to devising and presenting 
argumentation” (p. 4). In order to win audience adherence, a disputant must create the 
impression of superiority (p. 4; cf. p. 7) […] and why not by any means necessary to that 
end? 
 
3. A PROBLEM FOR ARGUMENT EVALUATION 
 
Van Laar fully recognizes the problem that this kind of argumentation has for argument 
evaluation—eristic discussion would seem not bound by any commitments on the part of 
each disputant, since  
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there is less cooperation than prescribed by the norms for critical discussion, and that the 
contestants are typically unwilling to bind themselves to propositions or procedures. (p. 3; author’s 
emphasis; cf. p. 8) 
 
Even a whole-hearted commitment to the rules for critical discussion cannot be taken for granted 
here. Lacking such commitments, how could contextual knowledge of this kind of activity be 
useful when evaluating argumentative discourse that is to serve polemic purposes? (p. 3) 
 
However, van Laar really has two problems to address. The one, as he mentions, is to 
describe the dynamics of eristic discussion; this project takes a metalogical posture and is 
admittedly descriptive. The other, again metalogical, is assessing whether any normative 
principles can genuinely apply to eristic discussion. He is modestly successful, as he 
acknowledges, with addressing the first of these problems. The second is more troubling 
because it strikes at a foundational problem within philosophy of argument, namely, its 
falling afoul of nihilistic relativism. His project is complicated by the explicit goal of 
eristic discussion to win. Van Laar does not sufficiently distinguish resolving each of 
these problems as each requiring a distinct project. 
 
4. VAN LAAR’S STRATEGY 
 
Recognizing the special problem that eristic discussion does not easily restrict itself to 
binding rules, Van Laar has to find someone else who will restrict it accordingly. He 
immediately turns to the pragma-dialectical perspective that itself (1) subscribes to the 
principles of critical discussion and (2) embraces the argumentative purposes of 
mediating the interests of (i) dispute resolution and (ii) rhetorical adherence. Accordingly, 
then, since eristic discussion is not qualitatively different from other kinds of 
argumentation,  
 
we ought not to adopt different argumentative norms for different dialogue types [as also] […] we 
should not adopt a more liberal perspective when evaluating reasoning used for polemic purposes 
(p. 2).  
 
Now, because argument context is of crucial importance in evaluation, and because, 
within critical discussion theory, context provides criteria for determining desirable 
consequences— 
 
these criteria can be reconstructed as contextual specifications of the norms for critical discussion 
that the participants can agree upon in the opening stage of a critical discussion. By entering a 
particular argumentative type, a person implicitly commits himself to this outcome of the 
(implicit) opening stage. (p. 2) 
 
And here the opening stage concerns the kind of argumentation activity, whether, for 
example, a parliamentary debate or mediating a divorce settlement. In any case, now an 
array of criteria subordinating the license of a disputant comes flooding in. 
 
 Critical discussion prescribes a high level of cooperation between the 
participants 
 There are any number of opening agreements, one of which is having a shared 
goal to win 
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 And there are the rules and commandments of critical discussion, that in 
effect are moral imperatives, with all attending rights, privileges, immunities, 
and duties 
 
Once van Laar has brought eristic discussion under the purview of critical 
discussion, he can impose a set of legitimate and correct rules of discourse binding on 
the disputants in their identical interest to win the contest. Again: 
 
[…] one of the main devices [tactics], if not the crucial device, will be that of presenting 
argumentation with which one appears, correctly or not, to be making progress towards persuading 
and winning over the respondent [goal]. An eristic discussion, therefore, is a clash between 
disputants who try to create an image of argumentative reasonableness and assertiveness. (p. 5; cf. 
pp. 4-5) 
 
Besides confusing tactics and goal here, van Laar seems to shift the objective from 
winning over the audience to winning over the respondent. The goal is to go home with 
the prize; the means for achieving that goal is to establish audience adherence, to win the 
audience—his/her respondent is an incidental instrument whom he must discredit in any 
number of ways to secure the affection of his/her audience. We can see the antagonist 
reach for old Nietzsche: 
 
The falseness of an opinion is not for us any objection to it: it is here, perhaps, that our new 
language sounds most strangely. The question is, how far an opinion is life-furthering, life- 
preserving, species-preserving, perhaps species-rearing, and we are fundamentally inclined to 
maintain that the falsest opinions […] are the most indispensable to us, that without a recognition 
of logical fictions, without a comparison of reality with the purely imagined world of the absolute 
and immutable, without a constant counterfeiting of the world by means of numbers, man could 
not live—that the renunciation of false opinions would be a renunciation of life, a negation of life. 
(BG&E ch 1 § 4) 
 
Van Laar is concerned about legitimate and illegitimate argumentative moves, and 
in preparing for his assessment of argumentative bluff he introduces three assumptions (p. 
5). 
 
 we are dealing with a kind of eristic discussion where the audience takes this 
latter approach, pushing the disputants to balance reasonableness and 
effectiveness in their overall performance but not at teach individual 
conversational contribution 
 the audience adopts the pragma-dialectical concept of reasonableness that is 
specified in the model for critical discussion 
 the audience only judges an (elementary or complex) argumentation to be 
effective for the adversary if, in the end, the adversary both accepts the basic 
premises and the justificatory force of each of the reasoning steps 
 
When van Laar then turns directly to treat argumentative bluff, he does so within his 
prescription of critical discussion and treats it appropriately as one tactic, technique or 
device, used in eristic discussion toward winning the contest. He categorizes an 
argumentative bluff as a technique whereby a disputant “intentionally conveys an 
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argumentative pretence that he considers himself false or unwarranted” (p. 7), but not for 
this to be an illegitimate device, whether the pretence is for effectiveness or 
reasonableness (p. 6). The substance of a bluff is for a disputant to assess risk (p. 7) and 
this is determined according to utility. 
Van Laar’s project is to establish argumentative bluff as subject to evaluative 
criteria since it is a device within eristic discussion, which he earlier affirms as subject to 
evaluative criteria as an instance of critical discussion. His project, then, once having 
made these admissions about using bluff in eristic discussion, is to make sense of when 
such bluffing would ever be illegitimate or incorrect (p. 8). 
He works to accomplish this by referring to “eristic discussion’s intrinsic 
normativity,” that is, that bluffing is “correct or legitimate in so far as it serves the 
purpose of establishing the appropriate intellectual hierarchy between the disputants” (p. 
8). Of course, he sees this normativity couched within the prescriptive character of 
pragma-dialectics and critical discussion, whose aims are to resolve difference of opinion. 
And here is how he answers an objection that eristic discussion circumvents being subject 
to norms of critical discussion (p. 8). 
 
First, when we are interested in argumentation, we are justified to employ the normative theory of 
a critical discussion when sifting out and evaluating the argumentative aspects of the discourse. 
Even if a disputant is not at all concerned, mentally, with dialectical reasonableness, that does not 
count against the appropriateness of the choice to reconstruct and evaluate his contributions from 
the stance of reasonable argumentation. 
 
Second, we have seen that even in an eristic discussion, the participants uphold a pretence to 
reasonableness that applies to their overall performance […] So, there is a commitment to 
argumentative reasonableness, and, in principle, there is some ground for pinning a disputant 
down on the results of an evaluation that has started from the norms for reasonable discussion. 
 
Van Laar then believes himself secure in holding that rules for critical discussion “can be 
made to apply” in the case of eristic discussion. And while an “audience may happen to 
value rhetorical assertiveness higher than is desirable from a critical perspective,” we 
should not be lulled into conflating the notions of assertiveness and reasonableness (p. 8). 
 
5. THREE PRINCIPAL CONCERNS 
 
Now, notwithstanding the profoundly antagonist character of eristic discourse, van Laar 
affirms that while there is “plenty of elbow room for vicious and deceptive tactics, there 
are various restrictions that they [participants] need to take into account” that somehow 
arise from within the eristic situation. 
 
For example, a participant is committed to giving the other side a chance at having a say; physical 
violence and open threats are considered inappropriate; each contribution must at least to some 
minimal degree be relevant for the difference of opinion that underlies the antagonism; lies are 
improper; et cetera. The main goal of this kind of dialogue generates a minimal level of internal 
normativity (cf. Van Eemeren et al forthcoming). (p. 4) 
 
He even invokes the rights of an opponent and the duties of the antagonist to 
systematically and critically challenge his/her protagonist’s position. Which master is the 
disputant serving—the audience or the argumentation analyst? 
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Our response to this statement is to ask—why would any self-respecting 
antagonist, who recognizes that the sole purpose is to win the argument as established on 
the authority of his/her audience, allow such constraints or restrictions to be imposed on a 
good fight? After all, neither of the two disputants is concerned with truth but only with 
effectively gaining audience adherence. And he/she achieves this goal by cleverly using 
argumentative tropes to work his/her audience and clever argumentative moves to 
manoeuvre his/her respondent to create in the minds of the audience his/her own 
superiority. We might recall the challenge put to Socrates in Republic by Glaucon and 
Adeimantus that the desire for justice is the plea of the weaker. 
Van Laar wants to extract criteria that are legitimate and correct by reference to 
practices that are good, successful, reasonable, effective while at the same time holding 
disputants accountable to criteria lying beyond effectiveness. He has set himself an 
impossible task just in the fact that any of these criteria is arbitrary—and this situation is 
compounded by his recognizing that an eristic disputant is solely concerned with (1) 
winning the contest, by (2) manipulating audience sentiments in his favour, by means of 
(3) creating appearances in their minds. And if any criterion is not arbitrary, who is the 
independent judge deciding this matter? However, rather than extracting a set of 
immanent, intrinsic criteria, he imposes a set of criteria external to the eristic situation 
from critical discussion theory. 
Below we raise three concerns that we believe van Laar must address to take more 
successful steps toward developing a theory of eristic discussion, a project with which we 
are entirely sympathetic. Our concerns are more philosophical than they are more 
immediately pragmatic about argument assessment, and they aim to promote his work 
toward its successful completion. 
 
Ontic/phenomenologic fallacy. Van Laar repeatedly shifts between what is genuine and 
what is spurious or apparent as if to suggest there being a clear line drawn between them 
but which line he continually disregards. This practice is especially problematic in the 
case of what is reasonable. This practice is not special to van Laar, but endemic to 
discussions among philosophers of argument when the goodness of an argument turns on 
audience adherence. Where other philosophers of argument have invoked the universal 
audience to mediate their problems in this connection, van Laar invokes critical 
discussion theory. 
Once we venture into the minds of an audience—into the realm of 
phenomenological subjectivism—composed as it is of laymen and, more pertinently 
problematic, contextualized by any number of factors—ethnicity, gender, education, 
region, class, religion, etc.—we are in ‘the night in which all cows are black.’ The project 
of a disputant is to create an appearance of effectiveness and an appearance of 
reasonableness in the minds of audience participants by deploying any number of 
argumentative devices to win audience adherence. In effect, there are no fallacies, there 
are no falsehoods, and there are no illegitimate moves so long as an audience, admittedly 
“the ultimate judge,” does not recognize any argument-move to be such. 
Van Laar recognizes this problem, since on the one hand he subscribes to the 
reasonable being context dependent while on the other hand, wanting to have eristic 
discussion subordinated to the same evaluative criteria as other dialogue types, he 
subscribes to the reasonable being context independent. He does not resolve this tension. 
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Van Laar, as a good argumentation theorist recognizes, requires some 
foundational reference point to make sense of when a disputant would have broken a rule. 
However, no such foundation is forthcoming once audience adherence reigns supreme as 
foundational for argument evaluation. At this juncture, were such a foundation possible, 
we would need a competent adjudicator who works with a set of objective criteria for 
argument assessment to mediate between (1) what an audience believes and (2) what is 
the case apart from audience beliefs in relation to a given eristic situation. Is this judge 
the audience or the argumentation analyst? What authority does either have in respect of 
establishing, or working with, objective criteria? And from what source or upon what 
ground does this authority derive? 
The problem remains—who establishes the components of reasonableness in an 
arena where the appearance or pretence of reasonableness is the deciding factor and the 
outcome is winning and not, or only incidentally, resolving some difference of opinion. 
Whose reasonableness is the analog of whose acceptability in the case of premises or 
inferential links in an argumentation. Van Laar warns us not to conflate notions of 
reasonableness and effectiveness. We in turn warn him not to conflate genuine 
reasonableness with the appearance of reasonableness, the analyst with the audience, and 
describing the dynamics of an eristic situation with prescribing norms for its assessment. 
However, he has already conflated being reasonable and the appearance of being 
reasonable and making specious in the process any expectation that a disputant make a 
commitment to reasonableness—the most we can expect is a commitment to the 
appearance of reasonableness. And in this connection, who is to determine what is 
reasonable? The issue of fixing the notion of reasonableness is linked to the arbiter. 
 
Shifting between two judges. Who, then, is the judge in the case of eristic discussion? 
Who decides the winner in the contest—the analyst, that is, the argumentation 
philosopher who is external to an argumentation situation or the audience who is 
immersed in the argumentative situation? Van Laar throughout his discussion shifts 
between the two, and this accounts in part for his unsuccessfully developing independent 
criteria for evaluating eristic discussion.1 
On the one hand, there is the matter of argument assessment and the standards for 
such assessment by professionals. And on the other hand, there is the closely related but 
distinct concern of establishing audience adherence, that is, the audience undertaking its 
own assessment, itself consisting in laymen. 
In the first case, the judges are putative experts—philosophers, argumentation 
theorists—who study argumentations of diverse kinds, with both a descriptive eye toward 
laying out what transpires in any given discourse and an eye toward establishing a set of 
normative criteria of a good argument. In particular, such an analyst has as a principal 
concern to reconstruct the argumentation, and undertaking this task usually requires 
reference to a theoretical framework. Van Laar has opted to reconstruct eristic discourse 
according to the prescriptions of critical discussion. 
                                                            
1 Van Laar seems to introduce a third judge, the critic. He writes, in respect of assigning pretence risks: 
“the critic assigns chances to particular verdicts by the audience and values to those results as fixed by 
the audience.” (7) Perhaps he means nothing more that to denote the analyst outside the process, 
although he seems to indicate that being a critic is a role of a disputant (7; cf. 9). 
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In the second case, there are laymen, unprofessional participants in the open arena 
of an eristic discussion, who are not experts, whether in — 
 
 deciding the truth-value of the propositions or speech acts presented in an 
argumentation 
 assessing the formal matters of logic, such as logical consequence 
 assessing fallacious reasoning, whether pertaining to the argument text or to 
rules managing a discourse 
 recognizing the psychological and sociological dimensions of social activity. 
 
Nevertheless, the audience is expected to keep score by selecting from various criteria to 
decide the victor. 
When van Laar injects notions of appropriate, correct, legitimate, honourable, 
genuine he eclipses the authority of the audience by the authority of the analyst who has 
now assumed the role of external mediator or omnipotent administrator. In effect, van 
Laar has outlined a procedure for managing an audience. He has the analyst control the 
notion of reasonableness who has now become the ultimate judge. The shifting in the 
authority of what is reasonable devolves to the shifting in judicial authority. 
 
Begging the question. The entire discussion has an air of contrivance and artificiality, 
since Van Laar has introduced from outside the framework of pragma-dialectics, with its 
subscription to the commandments of critical discussion along with mediating the 
interests of rhetorical effectiveness and conflict resolution. Instead of extracting criteria 
for evaluation immanent in the eristic situation, he has anticipated his locating norms for 
eristic discussion by assuming them at the outset, even citing eristic discourse as having a 
“minimal level of internal normativity” (p. 4; author’s emphasis), as having “intrinsic 
normativity” (p. 8). However, this normativity had already been prescribed at the outset 
by his framing the discussion within the commandments of critical discussion—and his 
set of assumptions (p. 5) secures the outcome. 
 
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
Van Laar nicely distinguishes eristic discussion from other forms of dialogue types and 
identifies the special problem for argumentation analysis. We believe that he has 
successfully initiated discussion on parsing eristic discourse, and we agree that more 
work needs to be done toward developing a theory of eristic discussion. We await the 
outcome in respect of establishing normative constraints on eristic discourse. 
Van Laar has also nicely framed discussion about eristic discourse within the 
parameters of critical discussion and pragma-dialectics. While we have been critical of 
this move, our comments were directed to larger problems within philosophy of 
argument, principally having to do with addressing the problem of nihilistic relativism. 
Accordingly, our remarks ask that we delve more deeply into the foundations of 
argumentation theory and become especially self-reflective on its shortcomings. 
Van Laar has focused attention on a foundational problem with reference to eristic 
discourse. However, we believe his invoking the game-model is problematic and 
frustrates his purpose, especially because of the peculiar character of eristic discourse that 
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he so carefully articulated. While eristic discourse might be played out in a gentleman’s 
arena circumscribed by rules of ‘good sportsmanship,’ this is not the case in a great deal 
of eristic discourse in today’s contentious world. Most of van Laar’s examples really do 
not fall under eristic discussion but rather under discourse aimed at conflict resolution or 
mediation. Were he to include reference to engaging any of the right wing newscasters in 
the US today and their audiences, he might be more challenged to find intrinsic 
normativity. 
 
          Link to paper 
